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Abstract
The ‘Black Thursday’ crisis in cryptocurrency markets demonstrated
deleveraging risks in over-collateralized lending and stablecoins. We de-
velop a stochastic model of over-collateralized stablecoins that helps ex-
plain such crises. In our model, the stablecoin supply is decided by spec-
ulators who optimize the profitability of a leveraged position while incor-
porating the forward-looking cost of collateral liquidations, which involves
the endogenous price of the stablecoin. We formally characterize stable
and unstable domains for the stablecoin. We prove bounds on the prob-
abilities of large deviations and quadratic variation in the stable domain
and distinctly greater price variance in the unstable domain. The unsta-
ble domain can be triggered by large deviations, collapsed expectations,
and liquidity problems from deleveraging. We formally characterize a de-
flationary deleveraging spiral as a submartingale that can cause such liq-
uidity problems in a crisis. We also demonstrate ‘perfect’ stability results
in idealized settings and discuss mechanisms which could bring realistic
settings closer to the idealized stable settings.
1 Introduction
OnMarch 12, 2020, called ‘Black Thursday’ during the COVID-19 market panic,
cryptocurrency prices dropped ∼ 50% in the day. This was accompanied by cas-
cading liquidations on cryptocurrency leverage platforms, including both cen-
tralized platforms like exchanges and new decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms
that facilitate on-chain over-collateralized lending. Among many events from
this day, the story of Maker’s stablecoin Dai stands out, which entered a defla-
tionary deleveraging spiral. This triggered high volatility of the ‘stable’ asset
and a breakdown of the collateral liquidation process. Due to market illiquidity
exacerbated by network congestion, some collateral liquidations were performed
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at near-zero prices. As a result, the system developed a collateral shortfall,
which prompted an emergency response and had to be made up by selling new
equity-like tokens to recapitalize [18].
During this time, there was a huge demand for Dai. It became a much riskier
and more volatile asset, yet traded at a high premium and fetched lending rates
in the mid double digits. Leveraged speculators, who must repurchase Dai in
order to deleverage their positions, were exhausting Dai liquidity, driving up
the price of Dai and subsequently increasing the cost of future deleveraging
(we discuss some further causes that led to market illiquidity in developing
the model in the next section). These speculators began to realize that, in
these conditions, they face concrete risk that a debt reduction of $1 could cost
a significant premium. Eventually, a new exogenously stable asset–the USD-
backed custodial stablecoin USDC–had to be brought in as a new collateral
type to stabilize the system [10].
1.1 Stablecoins
A stablecoin is a cryptocurrency with added economic structure that aims to
stabilize price/purchasing power. For a recent overview of stablecoins, see e.g.
[4] and the references therein. Stablecoins are meant to bootstrap price stability
into cryptocurrencies as a stop-gap measure for adoption. Current projects are
either custodial and rely on custodians to hold reserve assets off-chain (e.g.,
$1 per coin) or non-custodial and set up a risk transfer market through on-
chain contracts. Non-custodial stablecoins aim to retain the property of reduced
counterparty/censorship risk.
Non-custodial stablecoins transfer risk from stablecoin holders to specula-
tors, who hold leveraged collateralized positions in cryptocurrencies.1 A dy-
namic deleveraging process balances positions if collateral value deviates too
much, as determined by a price feed. This is similar to a tranche structure,
in which stablecoins act like senior debt, with the addition of dynamic delever-
aging. Two major risks in these stablecoins emerge around market structure
collapse and price feed and governance manipulation. In this paper, we focus
completely on the market structure risk, assuming that price feeds, governance,
and the underlying blockchain perform as expected.2
In addition to the COVID-19 panic, the effects of these risks are also wit-
nessed in bitUSD, Steem Dollars, and NuBits, which have suffered serious de-
pegging events in 2018 [16], and Terra and Synthetix, which suffered price feed
manipulation attacks in 2019 ([27], [28], [30]) and similar manipulations on the
bZx lending protocol in 2020 ([22], [23]). Stablecoins currently serve a central
role in an increasingly complex decentralized finance environment, involving
composability with other DeFi platforms. In addition, many other blockchain
assets, such as synthetic and cross-chain assets, rely on the basic mechanism
behind stablecoins, which we discuss further in the discussion section.
1‘Leverage’ means that speculators holds > 1× initial assets but face new liabilities.
2Note, however, that blockchain congestion can serve to decrease elasticity in the market
structure, which we discuss in the model construction.
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1.2 This paper
In this paper, we construct a stochastic model of over-collateralized stable assets,
including non-custodial stablecoins, with an endogenous price (Section 2). The
system is based on a speculator who solves an optimization problem accounting
for potential returns from leverage as well as potential liquidation costs. The
speculator decides the supply of stablecoins secured by its collateral position
while considering demand for the stablecoin.
We derive fundamental results about the model, including economic limits
to the speculator’s behavior, in Section 3. In Section 4 we develop the primary
results of the paper: we analytically characterize regions in which the stablecoin
exhibits stability (Theorems 1 and 2) and relative instability (Theorems 4 and
5), and a region in which a deleveraging spiral occurs that can cause liquidity
problems in a crisis (Theorem 3).
The context for our analytical results is a model with a single speculator fac-
ing imperfectly elastic demand for the stablecoin; however, many of the meth-
ods can extend to generalized settings. We consider such generalizations of
the model in Section 5 and consider how the stability results will differ given
different model structure, including ‘perfect’ stability in idealized settings and
practical applications to realistic settings.
We discuss in Section 6 a seeming contradiction that arises: while the goal
is to make decentralized non-custodial stablecoins, these can only be fully sta-
bilized from deleveraging effects by adding uncorrelated assets, which are cur-
rently centralized/custodial. This is a consequence of our instability results in
Section 4 and, as introduced in Section 5, the absence of a stable region in
idealized settings when underlying asset markets deviate from a submartingale
setting. We suggest an alternative: a buffer to dampen deleveraging effects
without directly incorporating custodial assets. This buffer works by separating
those who are willing to have stablecoins swapped to custodial assets in a crisis
(in return for an ongoing yield from option buyers) from those who require full
decentralization.
1.3 Relation to Prior Work
While there is a rich literature on related financial instruments, there is limited
research directly applicable to stablecoins.
We develop a simple stable asset model in [15] and introduce the concept of
deleveraging spirals. This paper supersedes that model and its results. Whereas
the model in [15] doesn’t directly account for the actual repurchase price in
deleveraging–instead delegating to a risk constraint in the optimization–we set
up a stochastic process model in this paper that includes forward-looking liq-
uidation prices in the speculator’s optimization. Our analytical results in this
paper supersede [15] in the following ways:
• We formally characterize a deleveraging spiral as a submartingale, whereas
[15] lacks a formal treatment.
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• Stability results in [15] are based on a volatility estimator. We prove sta-
bility in terms of probabilities of large deviations and quadratic variation.
• An unstable region is conjectured in [15], backed by simulation. We for-
mally prove distinct price variances in stable and unstable regions.
Option pricing theory is applied in [6] to value tranches in a proposed sta-
blecoin using PDE methods. In doing so, they need the simplifying assumption
that payouts (e.g., from liquidations) are exogenously stable, whereas they are
actually made in ETH and can cause price feedback effects in the stable asset.
In particular, stablecoin holders either hold market risk or are required to re-
buy into a reduced stablecoin market following liquidations. This motivates our
model to understand stablecoin feedback effects.
Stability in proposed stablecoins is simulated in [8] and [24], but under very
strict assumptions.
[9] discusses stablecoin concepts based on monetary policy and hedging
strategies and introduces methods for enhancing liquidity using combinatorial
auctions and automated market makers. [17] studied custodial stablecoins and
considers the use of hedging techniques to build an asset-backed cryptocurrency.
[11] explores the robustness of decentralized lending protocols to shocks and liq-
uidations. [7] explores competition between decentralized lending yields and
staking yields in proof-of-stake blockchains. However, these do not model a
stablecoin mechanism with endogenous price behavior.
[13] designs a reputation system for crypto-economic protocols to reduce col-
lateral requirements. This does not readily apply to understanding stablecoin
collaterals, however, as it requires identification of ‘good’ behavior and, addi-
tionally, stablecoin speculators face leveraged exchange rate bets and will have
reason to provide greater than minimal collateral. This additionally motivates
our model to understand how liquidation effects affect speculator decisions.
Stablecoins share similarities with currency peg models, e.g., [20] and [12]. In
these models, the government plays a mechanical market making role to seek sta-
bility and is not a player in the game. In contrast, in non-custodial stablecoins,
decentralized speculators take the market making role. They issue/withdraw
stablecoins to optimize profits and are not committed to maintaining a peg. In
a stablecoin, the best we can hope is that the protocol is well-designed and that
the peg is maintained with high probability through incentives. A fully strategic
model would be a complicated (and likely intractable) dynamic game.
There are also similarities with collateral and debt security markets and
repurchase agreements. These have also experienced unprecedented stress in
the COVID-19 market panic, during which even 30-year US government bonds–
normally highly liquid–have been difficult to trade [25]. Such debt securities
differ from stablecoins in that dollars are borrowed against the collateral as
opposed to a new instrument, like a stablecoin, with an endogenous price. These
debt security markets do, however, demonstrate that liquidity in the underlying
markets can dry up in crises even in highly liquid markets. Stablecoins face this
liquidity risk in the underlying market as well as an endogenous price effect on
the stable asset.
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The problem resembles classical market microstructure models (e.g., [21]);
it is a multi-period system with agents subject to leverage constraints that
take recurring actions according to their objectives. In contrast, the stablecoin
setting has no exogenously stable asset that is efficiently and instantly available.
Instead, agents make decisions that endogenously affect the price of the ‘stable’
asset and affect futures incentives.
2 Model
Our model is very closely related to Maker’s stablecoin Dai [19]. The model con-
tains a stablecoin market and two assets: a risky asset (ETH)3 with exogenous
price Xt and an ETH-collateralized stablecoin STBL with endogenous price Zt.
The stablecoin market connects stablecoin holders, who seek stability, and spec-
ulators, who make leveraged bets backing STBL. The STBL protocol requires
the STBL supply to be over-collateralized in ETH by collateral factor β.
In order to focus on the effects of speculator decisions in this paper, we
simplify the stablecoin holder demand as exogenous with constant unit price-
elasticity. This is equivalent to a fixed STBL demand D in dollar terms, though
not quantity. We relax this to arbitrary elasticity in Section 5, including the
perfectly elastic case. Note that there is no direct redemption process for sta-
blecoin holders aside from a global settlement/shutdown of the system at par
value, which can be triggered by a governance process (see [19]).
From a practical perspective, STBL demand is not elastic, at least short-
term, even if it were in principle elastic longer-term. A significant portion
of stablecoin supplies are locked in other applications, like lending protocols
and lotteries. These applications promise (in some sense) value safety in over-
collateralization, but don’t guarantee liquidity to withdraw. Additionally, Ethereum
transactions cannot be executed in parallel; during volatile times, transactions
can be delayed due to congestion, causing timely trades (especially involving
transfer to/from centralized exchanges) to fail. This occurs even if, in principle,
there is liquidity in these markets. On the other hand, longer-term demand elas-
ticity will naturally depend on the presence of good uncorrelated alternatives.4
We focus on the case of a single speculator, though we consider general-
izations that accommodate many speculators in Section 5. The speculator has
ETH locked in the system and decides the STBL supply, which represents a li-
ability against its locked collateral. At the start of step t, there are Lt−1 STBL
coins in supply. The speculator holds Nt−1 ETH and chooses to change the
STBL supply by ∆t = Lt − Lt−1. If ∆t > 0, the speculator sells new STBL on
the market for ETH at the market clearing price Zt, which is added to Nt. If
∆t < 0, the speculator buys STBL on the market, reducing Nt. The specula-
3We designate the risky asset as ETH for simplicity. In principle, it could be another
cryptoasset or even outside of a cryptocurrency setting.
4From another perspective, a strategic stablecoin holder would take into account expec-
tations about speculator issuance and ability to maintain the price target and expectations
about a global settlement. This is outside of our model as formulated.
5
tor’s locked collateral is N¯t and may or may not be equivalent to Nt. Informed
by limitations of actual implementations, we develop a particular formulation
for the process (N¯t) based on (Nt) in this section, though we discuss ways that
this can be generalized in Section 5.5 The speculator decides Lt by optimiz-
ing expected profitability in the next period based on expectations about ETH
returns and the cost of collateral liquidation if the collateral factor is breached.
Given supply and demand, the STBL market clears by setting demand equal
to supply in dollar terms. This yields the clearing price Zt =
D
Lt
. This clearing
equation is related to the quantity theory of money and is similar to the clearing
in automated market makers [1] but processed in batch.
2.1 Formal setup
We formalize the model as follows. We define the following parameters :
• D = STBL demand in dollar value (equivalent to constant unit price-
elasticity)
• β = STBL collateral factor
• α ≥ 1 liquidation fee (representing 1+% fee)
The system is composed of the following processes :
• (Xt)t≥0 = exogenous ETH price process
• Lt = stablecoin supply at time t that obeys
Lt = ζ + Lt−1 +∆t
where Lt−1 > 0 is the speculator’s STBL liabilities from the previous
period, ∆t is the speculator’s change in liabilities at time t (such that
Lt = Lt−1+∆t), and ζ ≥ 0 is an outside amount of STBL assumed to be
constant over time
• Nt = speculator’s ETH position at time t, including collateral
• N¯t = speculator’s locked ETH collateral at time t (and start of time t+1)
• (Yt)t≥0 = speculator’s value process
• Zt =
D
Lt
defines the STBL price process
We take (Ft)t≥0 to be the natural filtration whereFt = σ(X0, . . . , Xt,L0, . . . ,Lt).
The system is driven by the process (Xt) subject to the speculator’s decisions
∆t (equivalently Lt given Lt−1).
5In principle, the speculator’s decision could be extended to deciding N¯t in addition to Lt.
Note though that this would make most sense if the speculator’s position is further extended
to include multiple assets.
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To simplify the exposition of analytical results going forward, we simplify to
the case that β = 32 (the collateral factor used in Maker’s Dai stablecoin) and
ζ = 0. Note that under these conditions, and in the remainder of the paper, we
use Lt and Lt interchangeably. However, similar analytical results will extend
to the general setting, as we discuss in Section 5. We note that a non-zero
ζ may make numerical results more applicable to real settings as it removes
the singularity effect if Lt approaches 0, which is why we leave it in the model
exposition.
2.2 Collateral constraint
The collateral constraint requires the collateral locked in the system to be ≥
a factor of β times by liabilities. It applies in both a pre-decision and post-
decision sense. The pre-decision version determines when a liquidation occurs:
a liquidation is triggered at the start of time t if
N¯t−1Xt < βLt−1.
The post-decision version constrains the speculator’s decision-making, limiting
Lt such that
N¯tXt < βLt.
2.3 Speculator decides ∆t
We assume the speculator is risk-neutral and optimizes its next-period expected
value, taking into account expectations around liquidations. Note that the
assumption of risk neutrality can be removed by instead applying an appropriate
utility function–in some reasonable cases the results will still hold. Its value at
time t is its equity at the start of period (pre-decision), given by
Yt = Nt−1Xt − Lt−1 − liquidation effect
A liquidation effect is triggered as outlined in a following subsection.
Note that Nt is a function of the decision variable ∆t, and recall Lt =
Lt−1 +∆t. The speculator decides ∆t (equivalently Lt given Lt−1) to optimize
next-period expected value subject to the post-decision collateral constraint in
the current period:
max
∆t
E[Yt+1|Ft]
s.t. N¯tXt ≥ βLt
2.4 Speculator’s collateral at stake
We take the speculator’s collateral at stake at the start of time t + 1 to be
N¯t = Nt−1 minus any collateral liquidation that happens at time t. This is
consistent with the speculator’s collateral being blocked: it cannot be used to
repurchase STBL in the same step. This means that the speculator (1) has an
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outside amount (or is able to borrow) to repurchase STBL if ∆t < 0 and then
alter repays this from unlocking collateral and (2) can’t post proceeds of new
STBL issuance (∆t > 0) as collateral within the same step.
While there are settings in which we could alternatively use Nt as the col-
lateral at stake at the start of t + 1 (e.g., if flash loans are used), the choice
of Nt−1 additionally leads to a simpler exposition of results as it decouples the
collateral from the decision variable. This said, the general methods and results
would extend into the setting with Nt collateral, as we discuss in the Appendix
[refer to section].
2.5 Collateral liquidation mechanics
In time t+ 1, the pre-decision collateral constraint is N¯tXt+1 ≥ βLt. If this is
breached, then the speculator’s collateral is partially liquidated, if possible, to
repurchase an amount ℓt+1 > 0 of STBL such that post liquidation, N¯tXt+1 −
ℓt+1 = β(Lt − ℓt+1). If a liquidation occurs, this is
ℓt+1 =
βLt − N¯tXt+1
β − 1
= 3Lt − 2N¯tXt+1
with β = 32 . In a time step with a liquidation, the liquidation forces an up-
per bound ∆t+1 ≤ −ℓt+1, but the speculator could choose to repurchase more
STBL to further reduce leverage. The repurchase of ℓt+1 through the liquida-
tion mechanism is subject to a liquidation fee multiple α ≥ 1–i.e., the effective
repurchase price is α× the STBL market price. The purpose of this fee is that,
in real stablecoin systems, these liquidations are performed by arbitrageurs who
capture this fee. Notice that the STBL market price will itself be affected by the
liquidation. The liquidation does not guarantee that the collateral constraint is
met post-liquidation; whether this occurs will depend on the repurchase price
in the market.
Two thresholds are relevant at time t for calculating expectations of a liq-
uidation effect at time t + 1. These are non-time-dependent functions of the
random variable Lt:
b(Lt) :=
βLt
N¯t
c(Lt) :=
1
2N¯t
(√
α2D2 + 4αDLt + L2t − αD + Lt
)
The threshold b(Lt) gives the highest t+1 ETH price that breaches the collateral
constraint while the threshold c(Lt) gives the t + 1 ETH price that consumes
the entirety of the speculator’s locked collateral in a liquidation repurchase due
to the effect on STBL repurchase price.6 Below this level, the speculator cannot
meet the collateral demand even by liquidating everything. The formulation of
b(Lt) follows directly from the collateral constraint; the formulation of c(Lt)
6Note that the probability of a large deviation like this is not zero. For instance, it could
represent the possibility of a contentious hard fork that splits ETH value.
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follows from equating the repurchase cost of liquidation ℓt+1 to N¯tXt+1 and
solving for Xt+1.
If c(Lt) ≤ Xt+1 ≤ b(Lt), then the liquidation effect is ℓt+1 − ℓt+1
D
Lt−ℓt+1
α.
This represents a repurchase of ℓt+1 STBL (reducing collateral by the repurchase
price D
Lt−ℓt+1
with liquidation fee factor α) and subsequent reduction of the
speculator’s liabilities by the ℓt+1. The variables Lt+1 and Nt are affected
similarly.7 If Xt+1 < c(Lt), then the speculator’s collateral position is zeroed
out in the liquidation. We define the corresponding events
At = {Xt+1 ≥ b(Lt)}
Bt = {c(Lt) ≤ Xt+1 < b(Lt)}
2.6 System of random variables
Putting all the pieces together, we have the following system of random variables
driven by the random process (Xt):
Xt
Yt+1 =
∆tDXt+1
LtXt
+ (N¯tXt+1 − Lt)1At∪Bt +1Bt(3Lt − 2N¯tXt+1)
(
1−
αD
2N¯tXt+1 − 2Lt
)
∆∗t =


min
(
argmax∆t E[Yt+1|Ft],
N¯t−1Xt
β − Lt−1
)
if Xt ≥
βLt−1
N¯t−1
min
(
argmax∆t E[Yt+1|Ft],−(3Lt−1 − 2N¯t−1Xt)
)
if Xt <
βLt−1
N¯t−1
Lt = Lt−1 +∆
∗
t
Nt =
{
Nt−1 +∆
∗
t
Zt
Xt
if Xt ≥
βLt−1
N¯t−1
Nt−1 +
Zt
Xt
(∆t + (1− α)(3Lt−1 − 2N¯t−1Xt)) if Xt <
βLt−1
N¯t−1
N¯t =
{
Nt−1 if Xt ≥
βLt−1
N¯t−1
Nt−1 − α(3Lt−1 − 2N¯t−1Xt) if Xt <
βLt−1
N¯t−1
Zt =
D
Lt
In the above, the first case for ∆∗t comes from maximizing expected value
subject to the post-decision collateral constraint while the second cases for ∆∗t ,
Nt, and N¯t apply the liquidation effects that occur during time t.
3 Foundational Results
In this section, we derive foundational results about the model that we will use
to prove the primary results of the paper in the next section.
7Note that Nt is affected because this is the locked collateral at time t+ 1. Alternatively,
working with Nt+1 as locked collateral, we would update Nt+1.
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3.1 Assumptions
We begin by defining the assumptions we will use in the rest of the paper.
Assumption 1. (Xt) is a submartingale with respect to (Ft) and is independent
from (Lt) and (Nt).
Note that the submartingale assumption can be relaxed somewhat while pre-
serving some results. It is useful, though not necessarily critical, in our proof of
problem concavity. However, the results are most meaningful in a setting like a
submartingale, which always provides a fundamental reason that a speculator
might desire leverage. In such a setting, it is conceivable that the stablecoin
could maintain a dollar peg, whereas in long periods of negative expected re-
turns, the stablecoin concept falls apart as no speculators will want to partic-
ipate. As noted in the introduciton, such a deviation from the submartingale
setting appears to have occurred in March 2020. In Section 5, we elaborate how
the concept falls apart in such negative settings, even given otherwise perfect
market structure.
Also note that the submartingale differences need not be independent for
most results. In the Appendix, we further consider ways in which independence
of (Xt) and (Lt) can be relaxed.
Assumption 2. Each Xt+1 has a conditional probability distribution given Ft,
which admits a density function ft that is a.s. continuous.
Equivalently, we consider the process in terms of returns Rt, where Xt+1 =
XtRt+1. Conditioned on Ft, then Rt+1 admits density function gt. In the i.i.d.
setting for (Rt), the time dependence can be dropped. As noted above, for most
results, we do not need to assume i.i.d.
Assumption 3. There is some upper bound r ≥ supn E[Rn|Fn−1].
The next assumption is needed to interchange derivative and integration
operators in the improper setting. Note that it also translates to an upper
bound on Lt and a lower bound on Nt−1.
Assumption 4. There is some upper bound u ≥ c(Lt) for all Lt.
The next assumption bounds the STBL price away from singularity. As
discussed previously, it can be avoided under an alternative formulation of the
model.
Assumption 5. Lt ≥ v > 0 for some v.
The next assumption simplifies repurchase considerations. It is reasonable
given a reasonable bound r on expected returns.
Assumption 6. The liquidation premium factor α is sufficiently high that the
repurchase price in a liquidation is a.s. > 1.
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The next assumption translates to a reasonable condition on X distributions
considering b(Lt) is increasingly linearly whereas c(Lt) decreases with Lt.
Assumption 7. P(Bt|Ft) = P
(
c(Lt) ≤ Xt+1 ≤ b(Lt)|Ft
)
is increasing in Lt.
Define ψ(Lt) := E[Yt+1|Ft]. Note that ψ could have a subscript t, or equiv-
alently other time t inputs (N¯t, Xt, gt), but we relax notation as we only use it
in the context of time t. The next assumption ensures that ψ is concave in Lt,
a result that we prove in Prop. 1.
Assumption 8. αDNct2(Nct−Lt)2 ≤ 2 (note Lt ≥
27
46αD is sufficient).
Additionally, the next assumption ensures that ψ is strictly concave in Lt,
which we also prove in Prop. 1. Notice that this means that either the sub-
martingale inequality is strict at time t or there is non-zero probability that
a liquidation is triggered in the next step. Given that the latter is certainly
reasonable, this assumption is not much stronger than the basic submartingale
assumption.
Assumption 9. Either E[Rt+1|Ft] > 0 or P(Bt|Ft) = P
(
c(Lt) ≤ Xt+1 ≤
b(Lt)|Ft
)
> 0.
While strict concavity of ψ is not necessary for all results, it does simplify
the analysis considerably. More generally, concavity of ψ could reasonably be
expected in many settings, and so the assumptions can probably be relaxed.
Informally, reasonable distributions for Xt will have concentration about the
center. In this case, moving ∆t in the positive direction, expected liabilities
increase faster than revenue from new STBL issuance. Moving ∆t in the neg-
ative direction, the cost to buyback grows faster than the decrease in expected
liabilities.
3.2 Concavity and scale invariance
Our first result is to prove that ψ(Lt) is concave in Lt.
Prop. 1. Given Assumptions 1-8, ψ(Lt) := E[Yt+1|Ft] is concave in Lt.
Further, given additional Assumption 9, ψ(Lt) is strictly concave in Lt.
[Link to Proof]
In deriving some results, it will be useful to make assumptions about the scale
of the system. The next result shows that results about Zt should translate to
differently scaled systems, validating that such results will describe the STBL
price process more generally. In the following, we define h to output Lt as a
function of the system state.
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Prop. 2. Consider a system setup (Lt−1,D, Nt−1) with ETH price process
(Xt). For γ > 0,
h(γLt−1, γD, γNt−1, Xt) = γh(Lt−1,D, Nt−1, Xt)
h(Lt−1,D,
1
γ
Nt−1, γXt) = h(Lt−1,D, Nt−1, Xt)
As a result, the STBL price process (Zt) is equivalent across these system rescal-
ings.
[Link to Proof]
Under these condtions, we can interchange derivative and integration op-
erators in ∂ψ∂Lt according to Leibniz integral rules (a variation of dominated
convergence theorems). The speculator’s choice of Lt will fulfill the first order
condition of ∂ψ∂Lt = 0. From concavity, we can then conclude that the speculator
chooses to increase the STBL supply when ∂ψ∂Lt (Lt−1) > 0 and to decrease the
STBL supply when ∂ψ∂Lt (Lt−1) < 0.
Note that we can derive sufficient conditions for these events using Lemma 2
from the Appendix. Such conditions can be useful as concrete interpretations of
the events and can be checked against incoming data. That said, these general
sufficient conditions are far from necessary if we are given additional information
about the return distributions.
3.3 Economic limits to speculator behavior
We now present some fundamental results that bound the speculator’s decision-
making. These results will be useful in developing the primary results of the
paper in the next section. The next result introduces a lower bound to the spec-
ulator’s STBL supply decision that arises from the fundamental price impact of
repurchasing STBL.
Prop. 3. Suppose the pre-decision collateral constraint is met at time t. There
is a computable lower bound to ∆t.
We can interpret the lower bound in terms of a balance sheet constraint
describing when the speculator’s ETH position is exhausted in a repurchase.
We give the specific bound in the proof but note that it is not especially useful
on its own. Given information about the returns distribution and the level of
current collateral and considering ∂ψ∂Lt , much better bounds are possible.
[Link to Proof]
The next result provides a useful upper bound to the speculator decision Lt.
The result is derived from incentives to issue STBL. Intuitively, it says that if
supply is below this bound, then in some sense a marginal speculator may see
a profitable opportunity to expand supply. It’s simply not profitable to issue
12
more STBL than this bound. This doesn’t mean that the speculator decides to
achieve the bound, however, as it underestimates the liquidation costs that the
speculator might face.8 Notice that the bound is strongest when we have κ ∼ 1.
Prop. 4. Suppose either of the following hold for given κ:
•
∫ b(Lt)
Xt
c(Lt)
Xt
(
3− αDN¯tXtz
2(N¯tXtz−Lt)2
)
gt(z)dz ≤ 0 and P(At ∪Bt|Ft) ≥ κ
−1 > 0
• 1 ≥ P(At|Ft)− 2P(Bt|Ft) ≥ κ
−1 > 0
Then Lt ≤
√
κLt−1DE[Xt+1|Ft]/Xt
[Link to Proof].
The first condition comes from the derivative of the expected liquidation
effect with respect to Lt taking β =
3
2 . The integrand can be interpreted as
the effective leverage change in a given liquidation. Notice that this is < 0
evaluated at b(Lt) (small liquidations effectively reduce leverage) whereas it is
> 0 evaluated at c(Lt) (in very large liquidations, leverage reduction may not
be effective due to effect on repurchase price). The integral condition then says
that, in expectation, liquidations effectively reduce leverage. This is a generally
reasonable assumption given a starting state of sufficient over-collateralization,
since reasonable distributions ofXt+1 will place most mass in the integral around
b(Lt) as opposed to c(Lt), which is a tail event.
The second (alternative) condition says that the probability of having a
liquidation is sufficiently smaller than not having a liquidation.
This result holds if either of the two conditions hold, both of which could be
checked in data-driven modeling. We will formalize an assumption like the first
condition in the next section. Note, however, that similar results going forward
could be derived instead using a variation on the second condition.
4 Stable and Unstable Domains
The primary results of the paper characterize regions in which the stablecoin
price process can be interpreted as ‘stable’ and ‘unstable’. In this section, we
derive these results for the given model of a single speculator facing imperfectly
elastic demand for STBL. In the next section, we consider generalizations of the
model and how the stability results will differ given different model structure.
8Note that the model as formulated does not incorporate an interest rate paid by the
speculator on issued STBL (the ‘stability fee’ in Dai). Additionally, it does not incorporate
a possible yield if the speculator creates STBL to lend on a lending platform as opposed
to selling on the market. Under either of these extensions, Prop. 4 would change by an
appropriate factor.
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4.1 Domain barriers/Stopped processes
We establish stability results in terms of barriers. While the stablecoin process
is within certain barriers, we prove that it behaves in ways that are interpretable
as ‘stable’ and ‘unstable’. These barriers are generally stopping times, and we
proceed by considering the stopped processes.
Assume that in the initial condition, E
[
1
L1
|F0
]
≤ 1
L0
. We define the follow-
ing stopping times:
• τ is the hitting time of E
[
1
Lt+1
|Ft
]
> 1
Lt
,
• Tm is the hitting time of Zt > m, for m ≥ Z0,
• S1 is the hitting time of E[Lt+1|Ft] < Lt,
• S2 is the hitting time of E[Lt+1|Ft] ≥ Lt such that S2 > S1.
As we will see, while the stablecoin mechanism is working as intended, we
generally expect the STBL supply to increase (equivalently in this setting, the
STBL price to decrease, though in slow and bounded way). With this context in
mind, τ represents the first time we expect the STBL price to increase. Notice
that this is an expectation of reciprocal of supply, a convex function, and so
through Jensen’s inequality, this is weaker than expecting the speculator to
deleverage/reduce supply. It will be influenced heavily by the tails possibilities.
In particular, we have τ ≤ S1.
Note that the expectations of the process are not necessarily the same as the
actual movements of the process: τ does not necessarily correspond to the first
time the process actually increases in price. We track this with Tm, the time
the STBL price breaches a given level above Z0, which may be before or after
τ .
The stopping times S1 and S2 track when expectations about STBL sup-
ply change. These can be equivalently stated (and calculated in a data-driven
model) based on expectations about the derivative of E[Yt+2|Ft] with respect
to Lt+1 evaluated at Lt, similarly to the discussion from the previous section
on concavity.
Before proceeding, we formalize stopped versions of assumptions in Prop. 4.
The interpretation of these assumptions is the same as discussed in the previous
section. Note that the results going forward could also apply more generally
subject to additional stopping times embedding these assumptions. For no-
tational simplicity, we just present the results subject to the stopping times
already defined with the assumptions given.
Assumption 10. For t ≤ τ , P(At ∪Bt|Ft) = P(Xt+1 ≥ c(Lt)|Ft) ≥ κ
−1 > 0.
Assumption 11. For t ≤ τ ,
∫ b(Lt)
Xt
c(Lt)
Xt
(
3− αDN¯tXtz
2(N¯tXtz−Lt)2
)
gt(z)dz ≤ 0
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Notice that κ will be > 1 but ∼ 1 as X < c(Lt) is a low probability event.
Recall that the STBL price Zt is a function of collateral value, expectations
about ETH returns, and expectations of liquidation costs (related to tail risks).
These factors go into the speculator’s supply decision, which goes into Zt. Going
forward, we will explore how changes in these affect the STBL price process.
4.2 Stable domain
We characterize stability of the stablecoin process subject to the barriers τ and
Tm. In this domain, we derive bounds relating to large price movements and
quadratic variation.
Our first stability result bounds Zt under the condition TZ0 > τ . Con-
ditioned on this, the price is contained within small variation–e.g., consider
Z0 = 1 and consider
1
κr ∼ 1.
Prop. 5. Let r := supt
E[Xt+1]
Xt
. If TZ0 > τ , then
Z0 ≥ Zt∧τ ≥
√
D
κLt∧τ−1r
≥
D
(κDr)
2t−1
2t L
1
2t
0
And for any t, Lt∧τ ≤ κDr and Zt∧τ ≥
1
κr .
[Link to Proof]
Notice, however, that the condition TZ0 > τ introduces dependence on future
events. As such, we can’t conclude with the information at time t that the t+1
price is bounded in this way.
However, we can bound our expectations on the t+ 1 price given the infor-
mation at time t (Ft). This approach relies on the fact that the versions of the
process behaves nicely as submartingales in the stopped setting.
Prop. 6. (Lt∧τ ) is a submartingale bounded above and (Zt∧τ ) is a supermartin-
gale bounded below. Thus they converge a.s.
[Link to Proof]
An immediate bound on expected price comes from the fact that stopped
version of Zt is a supermartingale. This is the first result of the next proposition.
Additionally, with a stronger assumption on (Xt) that conditional expectation of
returns is non-decreasing within the domain barriers, we can bound the expected
price further.
Prop. 7. The process (Zt∧τ∧TZ0 ) is bounded in expectation by
Z0 ≥ E[Zt∧τ∧TZ0 ] ≥
1
κr
.
Further, assuming that for t < τ , (E[Rt+1|Ft]) is non-decreasing, then for t ≤ τ ,
Zt−1 ≥ E[Zt∧τ |Ft−1] ≥
√
D
κLt−1 E[Rt|Ft−1]
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[Link to Proof]
Going forward, we will work with a variation on the price process
Z ′t := |m− Zt| for given m ≥ Z0.
Using m = 1, this has concrete interpretation as the absolute price deviation
from the stablecoin peg. The stopped version of this process has the useful
property of being a non-negative submartingale. In addition, (Z ′t) shares similar
large deviation and quadratic variation properties with (Zt), which we explore
in the remainder of this subsection.
Lemma 1. The stopped process (Z ′t∧τ∧Tm) is a non-negative submartingale.
[Link to Proof]
We define the maximum process over some process (θt) as θ
∗
N = maxt≤N |Θt|.
The next result bounds the expected maximum of the deviation process (Zt).
Prop. 8. Suppose m ≥ Z0. Denote E := E[Zτ∧Tm −m|Zτ∧Tm > m]. Suppose
any one of the following conditions holds:
• 1κr > m and E >
1
κr −m
• 1κr = m and E > 0
• 1κr < m and E ≥ 0
Then E[Z ′∗τ∧Tm ] ≤ 2
(
m− 1κr
)
.
[Link to Proof]
The value (m − 1κr ) describes the range of the domain considered. Prior to
Tm, we know that the price falls in this range. The nontrivial part is describing
what happens at the stopping time as it exceeds this range if the stop is triggered
by Tm. The value E is the expected deviation at the stopping time given that
Tm triggers the stop. By definition, E > 0. Given reasonable κ, r, and m,
the condition for Prop. 8 is satisfied quite broadly. For instance, the concrete
instance with m = 1 is satisfied since 1κr < 1 taking into account the above
discussion on κ.
Notice that the analysis for the proof can lead to better bounds if we have
more information about E or p := P(Zτ∧Tm ≤ m), e.g., by incorporating in-
formation from other results above or from knowledge about the distributions
of (Xt). Additionally, the analysis can be used to bound either E or p given
bounds on the other.
We now state the first main results of the paper. Our next result applies
Doob’s inequality to bound the probability of large deviations in the stopped
process.
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Theorem 1. For m ≥ Z0 and ǫ > 0,
P
(
max
n≤τ∧Tm
Z ′n > ǫ
)
≤ 2ǫ−1
(
m−
1
κr
)
.
[Link to Proof]
The result can be pretty powerful. Consider the concrete case of m = 1, in
which case Z ′t describes the deviation from the peg, and take (arguably reason-
able) κ−1 = 0.999 (99.9% chance Xt won’t drop below c(Lt)) and r annualized
as 1.5 (daily r = 1.0011). Then the probability that the stablecoin deviates
from the peg by more than 0.1 is P(Z ′∗τ∧T1 > 0.1) ≤ 0.042.
Our next result derives from a form of Burkholder’s inequality that applies
to non-negative submartingales. We define the quadratic variation of (Z ′t) by
[Z ′]t :=
t∑
k=1
(Z ′k − Z
′
k−1)
2.
The quadratic variation is a stochastic process that measures how spread out
the underlying process is. Its expectation at time t is related to the variance
at that time, supposing variance is defined–in particular, they are equal if the
underlying process is a martingale. The result bounds the probability of large
quadratic variation in the stopped process. In essence, with high probability,
the quadratic variation can’t be too far away from the expected maximum.
Theorem 2. Suppose m ≥ Z0 and ǫ > 0. Then
P
(√
[Z ′]τ∧Tm > ǫ
)
≤ 6ǫ−1
(
m−
1
κr
)
[Link to Proof]
This result is also pretty powerful. Considering the same setting as above,
we have P(
√
[Z ′]τ∧T1 > 0.1) ≤ 0.127 in the stable domain.
Bounds on the expectation of quadratic variation can also be obtained using
a more classical form of Burkholder’s inequality, albeit with stronger assump-
tions. We develop this idea in the next remark.
Remark 1. There is an additional form of Burkholder’s inequality that extends
to non-negative submartingales. If we are additionally given a useful bound on
E
[(
Z ′τ∧Tm
)p]
for some 1 < p < ∞ (for instance, if we have some distribu-
tion assumptions on (Xt)), then we can apply Lemma 3.1 in [5] to derive the
following bound on quadratic variation expectations:
E
[(
[Z ′]τ∧Tm
)p] 1p
≤
9p
1
2
1− p−1
E
[(
Z ′τ∧Tm
)p] 1p
.
There is a lot of research on obtaining the best constants/bounds in Burkholder’s
inequality, which may be able to tighten the bound.
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Note that the classical two-sided Burkholder inequailty may not extend to
non-negative submartinagales. In general, only the first half of the Burkholder
inequality (bounding expectations about quadratic variation by the maximum)
extends to this setting and only for 1 < p < ∞. This contrasts with Prop. 2,
where we can derive results about probability of large quadratic variation of non-
negative submartingales for the p = 1 case. From a practical point of view, this
may be good enough.
Notice that with an effective bound on the expectation of quadratic variation
(QV) of the entire stable process, we have by law of large numbers
QV
n
→ 0 as n→∞.
So the longer the process is stable, the smaller the variability.
As we’ve characterized the stable domain based on τ and Tm, an exit from
this region corresponds to either a change in expectations (τ) or a large deviation
event (Tm).
4.3 Unstable domain
We now characterize how the stablecoin can be unstable outside of the stable
region barriers described above. The intuition for instability is that, in unstable
regions, the speculator’s position is nearer to c(Lt) and b(Lt), and so expected
costs of liquidation increase and are more sensitive to the threshold proximity, in
addition to being driven by the volatile process (Xt). The remaining results in
this section characterize a deflationary region and instability in terms of variance
of stablecoin prices corresponding to large deviations into such regions.
Our next result characterizes a deflationary region defined by stopping times
S1 and S2. In such a setting, an opposite behavior occurs compared to the stable
region: (Zt) behaves as a submartingale, depicting a deleveraging spiral.
Theorem 3. Restarting the process at S1, we have (Lt∧S2) is a supermartingale
and (Zt∧S2) is a submartingale.
[Link to Proof]
The previous result guarantees that the process, after crossing S1, enters a
deflationary region in a precise sense. Such a deflationary region will correspond
to depressed ETH expectations or collateral levels or increased expectations
around liquidation or deleveraging costs.
We now derive more practical tools to characterize instability without having
to detect if S1 has occurred. With these tools, we will establish more measurable
results in terms of forward-looking price variance of the stablecoin. We begin
in the next remark by setting up a variance estimation idea based on Taylor
approximation.
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Remark 2. (Estimating variances) Taylor approximations can be applied to
estimate the variances of the stablecoin process. Consider Xt = Xt−1Rt for
return Rt ≥ 0. For notational clarity, define
9
h(ρ, n) := argmax
Lt
E[Yt+1|Ft] = Lt,
where ρ, n are realizations of Rt, N¯t. Variance in stablecoin supply follows
Var(Lt|Ft−1) ≈ h
′
(
E[Rt|Ft−1], N¯t
)2
Var(Rt|Ft−1)
And the stablecoin price variance approximation is
Var(Zt|Ft−1) ≈
Dh′(E[Rt|Ft−1], N¯t)
2
E[Lt|Ft−1]4
Var(Rt|Ft−1) (1)
This is given informally, but could in principle be formalized using two steps of
compounded Taylor approximation error. The approximation error is arguably
moderate considering that our domain is bounded away from singularities (e.g.,
our lower bound results on L).
This variance approximation (Eq. 1 in Remark 2) is low in the stable do-
main and can be high in the unstable domain, as formalized in the following
Theorem 4. We introduce a few more assumptions that we use only in deriving
the remaining results in this section. Note that all of these assumptions come
down to assumed properties of the Rt distribution.
Assumption 12. The post-decision collateral constraint at time t is not binding
in the speculator’s maximization.
This first assumption means that the speculator’s objective fully accounts
for the post-decision collateral constraint (i.e., by maximizing the objective, the
speculator by extension also satisfies the constraint), which is reasonable unless
expected returns are excessively high.
Assumption 13. Returns Rt−1 and Rt are independent.
Assumption 14. ψ is twice continuously differentiable.
This last assumption restricts the density gt. We now present the result,
which applies the implicit function theorem to derive the derivatives of h, which
describe the sensitivity of h to price and collateral level.
Theorem 4. Under the above assumptions, the following hold:
1. ∂∂ρh(ρ, n)
∂
∂nh(ρ, n) exist.
2. ∂∂ρh(ρ, n) ≥ 0 and is increasing in −ρ by order of
1
ρ for ρ ≥
bt−1
Xt−1
, Lt > 8.
9As in the case of ψ, h could have a subscript t (or equivalently other time t inputs), but
we relax notation as we only use in the context of time t.
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3. ∂∂nh(ρ, n) ≥ 0 and is increasing in −n by order of
1
n for n ≥
bt−1
Xt
, Lt > 8.
4. ∃ε with 0 < ε < 1, s.t. ∂∂ρh(ρ, n) > 1 if ρ < ε , Lt >
27
46αD, and ct > 2.
As a result, the variance approximation in Eq. 1 increases by order of 1
R2t
in
−Rt and
1
N¯2t
in −N¯t.
[Link to Proof]
Theorem 4 shows that the variance approximation in Eq. 1 in Remark 2
increases by order of 1
R2t
during an ETH return shock (result 2). Similarly,
settings with lower collateralization in the initial conditions have higher variance
approximation by order of 1
N¯2t
(result 3). Such differences in initial conditions of
collateral could result from, for example, different realizations of liquidations or
the speculator abandoning its collateral position (and so extracting any excess
collateral it can). Result 4 shows that there are cases where the h′ factor in the
variance approximation is > 1, meaning that the variance of Rt, the inherently
volatile process, will carry through directly to Zt, the ‘stable’ process.
Note that the extra conditions on the scale of Lt and ct in Theorem 4 results
2-4 may seem strange at first sight. Since the (Zt) process is scale-invariant,
as proven in Prop. 2, the results about Zt variance hold more generally. In
particular, recall that a term of ∼ 1
Lt
shows up in the variance approximation
in Remark 2, which will cancel out the conditions on scale.
Up to this point, we have only been able to say things about variance estima-
tions. We will now show that the ‘stable’ and ‘unstable’ regimes are well-defined
in the following sense: given different initial conditions of the same process, the
forward-looking stablecoin price variances are indeed distinct. This is what
justifies calling them stable as opposed to unstable. If we start in the unstable
regime, we will always have variance higher than if we start in the stable regime.
The next result formalizes this.
Theorem 5. In addition to the previous assumptions, suppose Xt ≥ b(Lt−1)+ǫ
for some ǫ > 0 (the pre-decision collateral constraint is exceeded by ǫ, which
restricts the ranges of both Xt and N¯t−1). Consider two possible states s and
u of the stablecoin at time t that differ only in collateral amounts N¯st−1 > N
u
t−1
and evolve driven by the common price process (Xt). Then the forward-looking
price variances satisfy
Var(Zst |Ft−1) < Var(Z
u
t |Ft−1).
[Link to Proof]
Notice that special care should be given to the treatment of Zt under the
condition Xt ≤ c(Lt−1), as the STBL price may no longer be well-defined with-
out ζ > 0 as no collateral remains. In a real system, this is equivalent to the
event that all speculators are wiped out. The reason for our condition on Xt in
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the above result is partly to keep things well-defined and partly because there
can be a non-smooth point in h at Xt = b(Lt−1).
Similar variance difference results can be derived for varying initial condi-
tions of Xt−1 and Lt−1 as opposed to N¯t−1. In some sense, these are all similar
as they change the initial collateralization level, though there will be some dif-
ference in price effect.
The above analytical results describe domains of relative stability and insta-
bility for the stablecoin. They may also be adaptable into data-driven risk tools,
for instance to estimate probabilities of peg deviations and to infer about when
barriers are crossed exiting the stable domain. However, an obvious caution
applies that specific numerical results are highly model-specific and sensitive to
market structure and distributions of underlying assets.
5 Extending to Generalized Settings
We now explore how the analytical results will extend to different settings.
We first demonstrate good stability results in settings with ‘perfect’ market
structure. We then consider how analytical results from the previous section
will extend to generalized model settings.
5.1 Stability results in ‘perfect’ settings
In the previous section, we considered the given model of a single speculator
facing imperfectly elastic demand for STBL. We now consider idealized settings,
in which STBL demand is perfectly elastic and/or unlimited speculator supply
exists.
Perfectly elastic demand Under perfectly elastic demand, STBL demand
is time-dependent Dt, which adapts in each time period to match STBL supply.
This results in Zt = 1. In this case, the speculator’s issue and repurchase price
is always $1 and $α in a liquidation. The problem simplifies to evaluating
E[Yt+1|Ft] = ∆t E[Rt+1|Ft] +
∫ ∞
ct
Xt
(N¯tXtz − Lt)g(z)dz
+ (1− α)
∫ bt
Xt
ct
Xt
(3Lt − 2N¯tXtz)g(z)dz,
where the liquidation effect is now ℓt+1(1−α) where ℓt+1 = 3Lt− 2N¯tXt+1 and
c(Lt) =
3αLt
N¯t(2α+ 1)
.
In this setting, we have ∂ψ∂Lt = E[Rt+1|Ft] − P(At ∪ Bt) − 3(α − 1)P(Bt).
Recalling P(At) and P(Bt) are functions of Lt and supposing a non-binding
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collateral constraint, the speculator chooses Lt such that
E[Rt+1|Ft] = P(At ∪Bt) + 3(α− 1)P(Bt).
Noting that E[Rt+1] ≥ 1, P(At ∪ Bt) is decreasing in Lt but generally ∼ 1,
and P(Bt) is increasing in Lt, this is interpretable as the speculator balancing
expected return against 3× the expected (constant) liquidation cost in deciding
whether to issue a new unit of STBL.
In this setting, the STBL price is identically $1 and the speculator only faces
the risk of leveraged ETH declines subject to a fixed liquidation fee. Liquidations
generally work well to keep the system over-collateralized, and the only real risk
to STBL holders is from extreme single period declines in ETH price.
Unlimited speculator supply Suppose there is an infinite depth of specu-
lators (with capital) ready to enter the STBL market given what they see as a
profitable opportunity subject to STBL demand D. A marginal speculator in
such a market would choose to deposit collateral and issue new STBL at time
t if DLt−1
L2t
E[Rt+1|Ft]− γ > 0, where γ represents the marginal speculator’s ex-
pected liability and liquidation cost after entering the market. Arguably, γ ∼ 1
as, in an infinite depth market, the marginal speculator can start from a position
of low leverage.
The marginal profitability will be 0, which yields
Lt =
√
γDLt−1 E[Rt+1|Ft].
Notice the similarity with the upper bound in Prop. 4. In this case, we attain
the upper bound on supply because either the initial speculators act to increase
supply or a marginal speculator will see a profitable opportunity and bring us
to the upper bound.
Further using that (Xt) is a submartingale, in which case E[Rt+1|Ft] ≥ 1,
we find the STBL price is constrained to a small range of Z0 ≥ Zt ≥
1
γr . This
resembles the perfectly elastic demand case as existing speculators are able
to liquidate positions without influencing STBL price, in this case because new
marginal speculators are always willing to issue new STBL to offset a liquidation.
No stable region if (Xt) is not a submartingale Notice that the mech-
anisms that give the idealized settings perfect stability break down when the
ETH price process (Xt) is not a submartingale. This stresses how fragile the
stablecoin market is to negative expectations in the primary ETH market, even
under these idealized settings. In the unlimited speculator case, marginal spec-
ulators no longer enter the market if expectations are negative, and so we don’t
achieve the supply bound developed above. Instead, we return to the main set-
ting of the paper, which is unstable under negative expectations as it leads to
deleveraging effects. In the perfectly elastic demand setting, the STBL supply
goes to zero as the speculator chooses not to participate.
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5.2 Generalizing the model
We can generalize the single speculator model while retaining similar analytical
results. We briefly sketch out what these generalized models can look like and
discuss how these relate to realistic settings.
Concurrent collateral In the main analysis, we considered the speculator’s
collateral at stake at time t to be Nt−1 (minus any applicable liquidation).
Alternatively, we now consider the collateral at stake at time t to be
Nt = Nt−1 + (Lt − Lt−1)
D
Lt
1
Xt
where the second term represents the value in ETH obtained from issuing new
stablecoins at time t (negative if redeeming).
For notational simplicity drop subscripts as follows: Nt 7→ N , Xt 7→ X ,
Lt 7→ L, c(Lt) 7→ c, b(Lt) 7→ b, Rt+1 7→ R. And define ψ := E[Yt+1|Ft]. Notice
that N is now a function of L. Both b and c, which were previously functions
of L with parameter N , are now further complicated by N ’s dependency on L.
In this setting we have
ψ(L) =
∫ ∞
c/X
(NXz − L)g(z)dz +
∫ b/X
c/X
(
3L −
αDL
2NXz − L
− 2NXz
)
g(z)dz.
The partials become more complicated algebraically since N is now a func-
tion of L, e.g., partial with respect to L is
∂ψ
∂L
=
∫ ∞
c/X
(
DLt−1z
L2
− 1
)
g(z)dz
+
∫ b/X
c/X

αDL
(
2DLt−1z
L2
− 1
)
(2NXz − L)2
−
αD
2NXz − L
−
2DLt−1z
L2
+ 3

 g(z)dz.
Second partials of ψ are further complicated, as are the partials of b and c.
Similar results can in principle be derived in this setting, although we need
further conditions, for instance to extend the ψ concavity proof (e.g., to ensure
∂b
∂L ≥ 0).
Generalized STBL demand We can consider more general STBL demand
functions that depend on Zt. For instance, consider a constant elasticity market.
Let q be the quantity demanded of STBL at $1 price and suppose the quantity
demanded changes with price subject to a constant price elasticity −γ < 0.
Then we can consider the STBL demand function
Q(Zt) = q(1 − γ(1− Zt)).
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This leads to a dollar-denominated demand function
D(Zt) = ZtQ(Zt) = Ztq(1− γ(1− Zt)).
Our analysis in the previous section becomes the simplified case where γ = 1,
in which case dollar-denominated demand (but not quantity demanded) is con-
stant.
In clearing the market, the generalized price process becomes
Zt =
1
γ
(
Lt
q
− 1
)
+ 1
and the collateral process becomes
Nt = Nt−1 + (Lt − Lt−1)
(
1
γ
(
Lt
q
− 1
)
+ 1
)
1
Xt
which we can apply to get the generalized version of ψ. The general methods
used above can again apply to this formulation, though additional assumptions
may again be needed, for instance to extend the ψ concavity proof.
Generalized collateral factors and supply depth For a simple exposition,
we made the simplifications that the STBL supply is composed solely of coins
issued by the speculator (i.e., Lt = Lt with outside supply ζ = 0) and the
collateral factor β = 3/2. The results will apply for more general ζ ≥ 0 and
β > 1. The equations for this setting are as follows.
Drop subscripts: N¯t 7→ N , Xt 7→ X , Lt 7→ L, ct 7→ c, bt 7→ b, gt 7→ g,
Rt+1 7→ R. And recall Lt = ζ + Lt. Then
ψ(L) = (L− Lt−1)
D
L+ ζ
E[R|Ft] +
∫ ∞
c/X
(NXz − L)g(z)dz
+
∫ b/X
c/X
βL−NXz
β − 1
(
1−
αD
L+ ζ − βL−NXzβ−1
)
g(z)dz
with c(L) and b(L) similarly redefined.
Endogeneity of ETH prices We can also extend the model to consider
certain endogenizations of ETH prices. The intuition here is that a large enough
liquidation of collateral could have a market impact on ETH prices. One possible
way to endogenize ETH prices is to replace Xt+1 7→ f(Xt+1, N¯t, Lt), where f
describes the market impact of a collateral liquidation at t + 1 on t + 1 ETH
price and Xt+1 describes the (exogenous) price of ETH absent any liquidation.
We expect that the general methods used in this paper can be applied to
partial equilibrium settings such as this. Naturally, this would necessitate condi-
tions on f . Notice that the transformed ETH price process
(
f(Xt+1, N¯t, Lt)
)
t≥0
may no longer be a submartingale. In this case, we would need further condi-
tions on f that ensure ψ remains concave.
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Formulating as a multi-period control problem So far, we’ve specified
the speculator’s decision-making in terms of a sequence of one-period optimiza-
tion problems. However, there could be better long-term strategies. Alterna-
tively, the speculator could strategically coordinate the sequence of decisions
further into the future.
This can be formulated using an exit time for the speculator based on a
random clock, possibly exponential. If this terminal time is deterministic, the
problem can be formulated as a dynamic program, in which the terminal decision
is the one-period optimization, intermediate decisions solve a Bellman equation
conditioned on the information revealed up to that point, and random returns
are independent. It is possible to extend these results to a random exit time, if
that exit time is a ‘nice’ stopping time. For instance, [2] sets up a supermodular
game, for which this works.
For this to make sense conceptually, we need to assume the speculator can
cash out of its position by selling to someone else at par at the exit time. This
can include a noise factor of when this is possible. We expect that this noise
factor would need to be independent of the state of the system in order for the
problem to be tractable. A main challenge is that this will not in reality be
independent.
5.3 Note on realistic settings and applications
Realistic settings are likely to be somewhere in between the idealized settings
described in the previous subsection and the single speculator with imperfectly
elastic demand setting explored in this paper. As discussed in the model setup,
demand will be imperfectly elastic, at least in the short term. A reasonable
inelastic setting can be set by choosing an appropriate elasticity parameter for
the model.
A realistic setting will have multiple speculators, including some marginal
speculators, but the depth of the speculators will not be infinite. Further com-
plications will come when different speculators maintain positions with different
leverage points and/or ETH expectations. This can lead to a sequential sched-
ule of liquidation points at a given time throughout the system, which will be
reflected in a speculator’s expected liquidation costs. In particular, a given
speculator will take into account price effects from the potential liquidations of
other speculators’ positions in addition to their own when evaluating expected
liquidation costs. Additionally, expected liquidation costs will reflect expecta-
tions of marginal speculators stepping in to expand the supply. Of course, given
finite depth, the speculator market can dry up. For instance, the number of
people who expect positive ETH returns in an extended bear market may be
quite limited.
From the perspective of data-driven applications, we would use a comple-
mentary version of the model that incorporates an estimation function that the
speculator uses to estimate liquidation costs and price effect since the exact
market structure is not generally known in a real setting. See [1] and [14] for
examples developing agent-based models in this direction.
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6 Discussion
This paper presents a new stochastic model of over-collateralized stablecoins
with an endogenous price. In this model, we formally characterize stable and
unstable domains for the stablecoin and a deflationary deleveraging spiral as a
submartingale, which can cause liquidity problems in a crisis. We prove that
the stablecoin behaves in a stable way by bounding the probabilities of large
deviations and quadratic variation, restricted to a certain region. We also prove
that price variance is distinctly greater in a separate region, which can be trig-
gered by large deviations, collapsed expectations, and liquidity problems from
deleveraging.
An observation from the model is that the speculator chooses a collateral
level above the required collateral factor. This is because the expected liqui-
dation cost is greater than the $1 face value. The speculator will desire to
increase the collateralization during times when the expected liquidation cost
is higher, which can occur after a shock to collateral value or if the speculator
expects the collateral to be more volatile. This generally explains the high level
of over-collateralization seen in Dai, which typically ranges 2.5 − 5× although
the collateral factor is 1.5×.
The presence of deleveraging effects poses fundamental trade-offs in decen-
tralized design. One way to bring the stablecoin closer to the ‘perfect’ stability
cases is to increase elasticity of demand. This relies on the presence of good un-
correlated alternatives to the stablecoin. As all non-custodial stablecoins likely
face similar deleveraging risks, greater elasticity relies on custodial stablecoins
or greater exchangeability to fiat currencies. Another way to bring the stable-
coin closer ‘perfect’ stability is to increase the supply of marginal speculators.
As there will not be unlimited supply of speculators with positive ETH expecta-
tions (especially during an extended bear market), this relies on having another
uncorrelated collateral asset. As all decentralized assets are very correlated, this
again largely relies on including custodial collateral assets, like Maker’s recent
addition of USDC.10 While these measures strengthen the stability results, it’s
at the expense of greater centralization and moves the system away from being
‘non-custodial’.
We suggest a buffering idea toward damping deleveraging effects without
greater centralization. The Maker system charges fees to speculators, part of
which it passes on to Dai holders as an interest rate if the holder locks the Dai
into a savings pool. With modified mechanics, this savings pool can provide
a buffer to deleveraging effects. For instance, if we allow Dai in the savings
pool to be bought out at a reasonable premium by a speculator who uses it to
deleverage, then deleveraging effects are bounded by the premium amount up
to the size of the savings buffer. The Dai holders who participate in this savings
pool are then compensated for providing a repurchase option to the speculator.
The Dai holder could elect to have the repurchase fulfilled in the collateral asset,
10Recall that custodial assets face their own risks, however, which may not be uncorrelated
in extreme crises. This includes counterparty risk, bank run risks, asset seizure risk, and
effects from negative interest rates.
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or something else, like a custodial stablecoin. In this way, this mechanism can
provide some of the benefits of the ‘perfect’ stability settings while enabling Dai
holders to choose how decentralized they want to be. A Dai holder who does not
require high decentralization would elect to receive the compensation from the
savings pool whereas a Dai holder who requires higher decentralization would
choose not to use the savings pool. Our model is easily extended to consider
mechanisms like this.
Our model and results can also apply more broadly to synthetic and cross-
chain assets and over-collateralized lending protocols that allow borrowing of
illiquid and/or inelastic assets– whenever the mechanism is based on leveraged
positions and leads to an endogenous price of the created or borrowed asset. Syn-
thetic assets generally use a similar mechanism just with a different target peg.
Cross-chain assets that port an asset from a blockchain without smart contract
capability (e.g., Bitcoin) to a blockchain with smart contracts (e.g., Ethereum)
also tend to rely on a similar mechanism. In non-custodial constructions such
as [31] and [29], vault operators are required to lock ETH collateral in addition
to the deliverable BTC asset. They bear a leveraged ETH/BTC exchange rate
risk and face similar deleveraging risk. In particular, to reduce exposure, they
need to repurchase the version of the cross-chain asset on Ethereum.
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A Proofs
In the proofs, we often use the following elementary result
Lemma 2. For α,D, L ≥ 0,
αD + L ≤
√
α2D2 + 4αDL+ L2 ≤ min
(
2αD + L, αD + L+
√
2αDL
)
Proof. Define ε :=
√
α2D2 + 4αDL+ L2. We have ε ≤ 2αD +L as long as αD ≥ L(√3− 2),
which is true since α,D, L ≥ 0. Next, notice that ε =
√
(αD + L)2 + 2αDL. Thus ε > αD+L
since 2αDL ≥ 0. Lastly, by concavity, ε ≤ αD + L+√2αDL.
Prop. 1
Proof. Consider Xt+1 = XtRt+1. For notational simplicity, drop subscripts as follows: N¯t 7→
N , Xt 7→ X, Lt 7→ L, ∆ = Lt − Lt−1, c(Lt) 7→ c, b(Lt) 7→ b, gt 7→ g, Rt+1 7→ R. Define
ψ := E[Yt+1|Ft]. Then
ψ(L) = ∆ · DL E[R|Ft] +
∫ ∞
c/X
(NXz −L)g(z)dz +
∫ b/X
c/X
(
3L − αDL
2NXz − L − 2NXz
)
g(z)dz
Recall that the integrand factor
(
3L − αDL
2NXz−L
− 2NXz
)
evaluated at Xz = c is L − Nc
(the liquidation zeros out the speculator’s collateral position), and evaluated at Xz = b is 0
(on the threshold of liquidation).
Taking derivatives using Leibniz integral rule:
∂ψ
∂L =
DLt−1
L2 E[R|Ft]−
(
NX
c
X
− L
)
g
( c
X
) ∂c
∂L
1
X
−
∫ ∞
c
X
g(z)dz
−
(
L −NX c
X
)
g
( c
X
) ∂c
∂L
1
X
+
∫ b
X
c
X
(
3− αDNXz
2(NXz − L)2
)
g(z)dz
=
DLt−1
L2 E[R|Ft]−
∫ ∞
c
X
g(z)dz +
∫ b
X
c
X
(
3− αDNXz
2(NXz −L)2
)
g(z)dz
∂2ψ
∂L2 = −
2DLt−1
L3 E[R|Ft] + g
(
b
X
)
∂b
∂L
1
X
(
3− αDNb
2(Nb −L)2
)
− g
( c
X
) ∂c
∂L
1
X
(
2− αDNc
2(Nc− L)2
)
−
∫ b
X
c
X
αDNXz
(NXz − L)3 g(z)dz
Notice that ∂b
∂L
> 0, ∂c
∂L
> 0, g ≥ 0, and
3− αDNb
2(Nb −L)2 = 3−
αDβL
2(L(β − 1))2 = 3−
3αD
L < 0
by assumption that liquidation repurchase price always ≥ 1. Additionally, the remaining
integral is always positive as the integrand is positive between the limits and and g ≥ 0.
Finally, E[R|Ft] ≥ 0 since (Xt) is a submartingale. Thus under the given conditions, ∂
2ψ
∂L2
≤ 0
as all terms are ≤ 0.
Further supposing that either E[R|Ft] > 0 or P
(
c(L) < XR < b(L)
)
=
∫ b/X
c/X
g(z)dz > 0,
then ∂
2ψ
∂L2
< 0.
Notice that the 1
2
in the bound is related to the choice β = 3
2
.
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Prop. 2
Proof. Easily verifiable by substitution, noting that factors of γ cancel in the integral limits.
Prop. 3
Proof. The speculator can at most buy back using all its ETH. At time t, this amount is the
solution ∆t to the following
∆tD
Lt−1 +∆t
+Nt−1Xt − Lt−1 −∆t = 0
supposing there is no liquidation at time t. It is straightforward to verify the solution, giving
the lower bound:
∆t ≥ 1
2
(
−
√
D2 − 4DLt−1 + 2DNt−1Xt +N2t−1X2t +D − 2Lt−1 +Nt−1Xt
)
.
Note that if the speculator is not soluble at time t, then there is no real solution.
Prop. 4
Proof. As above, consider Xt+1 = XtRt+1. And for notational simplicity, drop subscripts
as follows: N¯t 7→ N , Xt 7→ X, Lt 7→ L, ∆ = Lt − Lt−1, c(Lt) 7→ c, b(Lt) 7→ b, gt 7→ g,
Rt+1 7→ R, P(At|Ft) 7→ P(A), P(Bt|Ft) 7→ P(B).
Suppose the first condition is true. We have
∂ψ
∂L =
DLt−1
L2 E[R|Ft]−
∫ ∞
c
X
g(z)dz +
∫ b
X
c
X
(
3− αDNXz
2(NXz −L)2
)
g(z)dz
≤ DLt−1L2 E[R|Ft]− P(A ∪ B)
≤ DLt−1L2 E[R|Ft]− κ
−1
Notice this is monotonic decreasing in L over the domain, so the critical point will be a bound
for the optimal value of L∗. Setting equal to 0, we have
L∗ ≤
√
κDLt−1 E[R|Ft]
Now suppose the second condition is true instead. We have
∂ψ
∂L =
DLt−1
L2 E[R|Ft]−
∫ ∞
b
X
g(z)dz + 2
∫ b
X
c
X
g(z)dz −
∫ b
X
c
X
αDNXz
2(NXz −L)2 g(z)dz
≤ DLt−1L2 E[R|Ft]−
(
P(A)− 2P(B)
)
≤ DLt−1L2 E[R|Ft]− κ
−1
which delivers the desired result as above.
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Prop. 5
Proof. By assuming TZ0 > τ , we have Z0 ≥ Zt∧τ . Applying Proposition 4 to Zt = DLt
provides Zt∧τ ≥
√
D
κLt∧τ−1r
. Notice that the upper bound on Lt and the lower bound on Zt
can be written respectively as increasing and decreasing sequences in t starting from initial
state as follows:
Lt = (κDr)
2t−1
2t L
1
2t
0
Zt =
D
(κDr)
2t−1
2t L
1
2t
0
These have limits L∞ = κDr and Z∞ = 1κr that also bound Lt and Zt respectively.
Prop. 6
Proof. For t − 1 < τ ,
D
E[Lt|Ft−1]
≤ E
[ D
Lt
|Ft−1
]
≤ DLt−1
by Jensen’s inequality and condition for τ > t− 1. Thus we have
E[Lt∧τ |Ft−1] ≥ Lt∧τ−1
and (Lt∧τ ) is a submartingale. (Zt∧τ ) is a supermartingale by condition of τ .
Applying Proposition 5, Lt∧τ is bounded above and Zt∧τ is bounded below. Thus they
converge a.s. by Doob’s martingale convergence theorem.
Prop. 7
Proof. The first inequality follows from Prop. 5 and supermartingale properties.
Since Zt∧τ is supermartingale, we have Zt−1 ≥ E[Zt|Ft−1]. Assume (E[Rt+1|Ft]) is
non-decreasing for t < τ . Then subject to the stopping time τ ,
E[Zt|Ft−1] ≥ E
[√
D
κLt−1 E[Rt+1|Ft]
|Ft−1
]
(Apply Prop. 4)
≥
√√√√ D
κLt−1 E
[
E[Rt+1|Ft]|Ft−1
] (Jensen’s inequality)
=
√
D
κLt−1 E[Rt+1|Ft−1]
(Tower property)
≥
√
D
κLt−1 E[Rt|Ft−1]
since E[Rt+1|Ft] ≥ E[Rt|Ft−1].
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Lemma 1
Proof. For t − 1 < τ ∧ Tm,
E [|m− Zt||Ft−1] ≥ |E[m− Zt|Ft−1]|
≥ |m− Zt−1|
by Jensen’s inequality and the condition for t−1 < Tm that m−Zt−1 ≥ 0. Thus
(
Z′t∧τ∧Tm
)
is a non-negative submartingale.
Prop. 8
Proof. Note for t < τ ∧ Tm, have Z∗t ≤ m, and so Z′∗τ∧Tm−1 ≤ m −
1
κr
. Thus Z′∗τ∧Tm ≤
max
(
m− 1
κr
, Z′τ∧Tm
)
.
Consider time t = τ ∧ Tm and note that optional stopping applies since Z is bounded.
Denote W := m − Zt, E := E[−W |Zt > m], and p := P(Zt ≤ m). From optional stopping,
we recall that m ≥ E[Zt] ≥ 1κr , and so 0 ≤ E[W ] ≤ m − 1κr . Then
E[W ] = E[W 1Zt≤m]− E[−W 1Zt>m]
≤ p
(
m− 1
κr
)
− (1 − p)E
Combining with 0 ≤ E[W ], we have 0 ≤ p(m− 1
κr
)− (1 − p)E, which gives
p ≥ E
m− 1
κr
+ E
Then noting that (1 − p)E ≤ E(1 − E
m− 1
κr
+E
), p ≤ 1, and E[Z′t] = E[W 1Zt≤m] +
E[−W 1Zt>m], we have
E[Z′∗t ] ≤ pE[Z′∗t−1] + (1− p)E
≤ m− 1
κr
+ E
(
1− E
m − 1
κr
+ E
)
= m− 1
κr
+
E(m− 1
κr
)
m− 1
κr
+E
Notice further that given either of the following conditions
• 1
κr
> m and E > 1
κr
−m
• 1
κr
= m and E > 0
• 1
κr
< m ad E ≥ 0
then
0 ≤ (1− p)E ≤ E(m−
1
κr
)
m− 1
κr
+ E
≤ m− 1
κr
Thus, recalling we used t = τ ∧ Tm, we get the following result
E[Z′∗τ∧Tm ] ≤ 2
(
m− 1
κr
)
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Theorem 1
Proof. Given Lemma 1 and Prop. 8 and noting E[Z′τ∧Tm ] ≤ E[Z′∗τ∧Tm ], apply Doob’s maximal
inequality.
Theorem 2
Proof. Apply Theorem 3.1 in [5], noting that supn E[Z
′
n∧τ∧Tm
] ≤ E[Z′∗τ∧Tm ] by Jensen’s
inequality.
Theorem 3
Proof. For S1 ≤ t < S2, we have
E
[ D
Lt
|Ft−1
]
≥ D
E[Lt|Ft−1]
≥ DLt−1
by Jensen’s inequality and the S1 condition E[Lt|Ft−1] ≤ Lt−1. Thus (ZS1∨t∧S2) is a sub-
martingale (though note that it can be a submartingale for more general stopping times than
this).
L started at S1 and stopped S2 is a supermartingale (by def).
Theorem 4
Proof. As above, consider Xt+1 = XtRt+1. And for notational simplicity, drop subscripts
as follows: N¯t 7→ N , Xt−1 7→ X (notice this is different from previous usage), Lt 7→ L,
∆ = Lt −Lt−1, c(Lt) 7→ c, b(Lt) 7→ b, and gt 7→ g.
Let ρ be (deterministic) variable representing the outcome of Rt, such that now we have
the outcome Xt = Xρ. And define h(ρ) = argmaxL ψ(ρ, L) = E[Yt+1|Ft]. By first order
condition, ∂
∂L
ψ(ρ, h(ρ)) = 0. The assumptions on ψ provide unique maximum and fulfill
conditions of the implicit function theorem, which gives us ∂h
∂ρ
(ρ) exists and
∂h
∂ρ
(ρ) = −
∂2
∂ρ∂L
ψ(ρ, h(ρ))
∂2
∂L2
ψ(ρ, h(ρ))
Calculating derivatives using the Leibniz integral rule (recalling c, b are functions of L),
∂2ψ
∂ρ∂L
= g
(
c
Xρ
)
c
Xρ2
(
4− αDNc
2(Nc− L)2
)
− g
(
b
Xρ
)
b
Xρ2
(
3− αDNb
2(Nb −L)2
)
+
∫ b
Xρ
c
Xρ
αDNXz(NXρz + L)
2(NXρz −L)3 g(z)dz
∂2ψ
∂L2
= −2DLt−1 E[Rt+1]L3 + g
(
b
Xρ
)
∂b
∂L
1
Xρ
(
3− αDNb
2(Nb −L)2
)
− g
(
c
Xρ
)
∂c
∂L
1
Xρ
(
2− αDNc
2(Nc− L)2
)
−
∫ b
Xρ
c
Xρ
αDNXρz
(NXρz −L)3 g(z)dz
Notice that (and continuing with β = 3/2)
3− αDNb
2(Nb −L)2 = 3−
αDβL
2(L(β − 1))2 = 3−
3αD
L < 0
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by assumption that liquidation repurchase price always ≥ 1. And
αDNc
2(Nc−L)2 ≤
1
2
αD(2αD + L− αD + L)
−2αD(2αD + L) + 2L(αD + L) + 2α2D2 + 2αDL+ 2L2
=
αD(αD + 2L)
4(αD + L)(2L − αD)
=
αD
12(αD + L) +
αD
3(2L− αD)
≤ 1
12
+
αD
3(2L− αD)
This is ≤ 2 when L ≥ 27
46
αD. Thus under this condition
4− αDNc
2(Nc− L)2 > 2−
αDNc
2(Nc−L)2 ≥ 0
Note that all terms of ∂
2ψ
∂ρ∂L
are non-negative and all terms of ∂
2ψ
∂L2
are non-positive. Given
ρ ≥ b/X, we have g
(
c
Xρ
)
and g
(
b
Xρ
)
are increasing in 1/ρ. Note also that ∂b
∂L
, ∂c
∂L
, and
2DLt−1 E[Rt+1]
L3
are constant in ρ. Lastly, the numerator and denominator integrals can be
rewritten respectively as
1
ρ
∫ b
c
αDNz(Nz + L)
2(Nz − L)3 g
(
z
Xρ
)
dz and
∫ b
c
αDNz
(Nz −L)3 g
(
z
Xρ
)
dz
and
αDNz(Nz+L)
2(Nz−L)3
≥ αDNz
(Nz−L)3
given Nz+L ≥ Nc+L > 2, for which L > 8 is sufficient. And
so the terms in the numerator of |h′(ρ)| are growing by a factor 1/ρ faster than the terms in
the denominator as ρ decreases, proving (2).
Next, note that under the condition 0 < ρ < 1,
b
Xρ2
=
βL
NXρ2
=
db
dL
L
Xρ2
≥ db
dL
1
Xρ
c
Xρ2
≥ dc
dL
1
Xρ2
≥ dc
dL
1
Xρ
The last relation uses the fact that dc
dL
≤ 2αD+L
2(αD+L)
+1 < 2, and so c > dc
dL
under the problem
setup.
Next note that for ρ ≤ L
8
and c ≤ Xρz ≤ b, we have
αDNXz(NXρz + L)
2(NXρz − L)3 ≥
αDNXρz
(NXρz −L)3
This is because the expression (1) simplifies to NXρz+L ≥ 2ρ, (2) to be true over the whole
range of z, we need Nc+ L ≥ 2ρ, and (3) ρ ≤ L
8
is sufficient for this. Thus
∫ b
Xρ
c
Xρ
αDNXz(NXρz + L)
2(NXρz − L)3 g(z)dz ≥
∫ b
Xρ
c
Xρ
αDNXρz
(NXρz −L)3 g(z)dz
under these conditions.
Then note that all terms in the numerator of h′(ρ) are greater than and grow faster in 1/ρ
than the comparable terms in the denominator. This leaves the first term in the numerator,
which is constant in ρ. To get (3), then note that ε can be chosen such that for ρ = ε, the
numerator and denominator are equal.
We can derive the results for ∂h
∂n
in essentially the same way. Alter the above dropping of
subscripts with Xt 7→ X, let n be a variable representing the realization of N¯t, and consider
h as a function of n. Note the following relevant derivatives.
∂b
∂n
= −βL
n2
= − b
n
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∂c
∂n
= − 1
2n2
(√
α2D2 + 4αDL+ L2 − αD + L
)
= − c
n
∂2ψ
∂n∂L
= g
( c
X
) c
n
(
2− αDnc
2(nc− L)2
)
− g
(
b
X
)
b
n
(
3− αDnb
2(nb −L)2
)
+
∫ b
X
c
X
αDnXz(nXz + L)
2(nXz −L)3 g(z)dz
And translating the following to the new notation
∂2ψ
∂L2
= −2DLt−1 E[Rt+1]L3 + g
(
b
X
)
∂b
∂L
1
X
(
3− αDnb
2(nb− L)2
)
− g
( c
X
) ∂c
∂L
1
X
(
2− αDnc
2(nc− L)2
)
−
∫ b
X
c
X
αDnXz
(nXz − L)3 g(z)dz
And by applying implicit function theorem, we get
∂h
∂n
(n) = −
∂2
∂n∂L
ψ(n, h(n))
∂2
∂L2
ψ(n, h(n))
.
From here we can proceed with the same analysis using factors of 1
n
instead of 1
ρ
.
Theorem 5
Proof. For notational simplicity, drop subscripts Xt 7→ X, N¯t−1 7→ N , Lt−1 7→ L. And
consider x a realization of X as variable in h. Define the function f(X, n) = 1
h(X,n)
where n
represents the realization of N . With probability 1, the following are true:
• h is concave in x and n because h′ is decreasing, as shown in the previous result.
• f is differentiable (wrt n and x) over domain using chain rule and implicit function
theorem.
• f is convex: it’s the composition of 1/x and h, and since 1/x is convex and non-
increasing and h is concave, so is f (see [3] 3.2.4).
• f is (strictly) decreasing (in n and x) since h is increasing.
• By assumption, we’ve restricted NX. The derivative of f at the minimum value exists
and is bounded.
• f is non-negative since h is non-negative.
• ∂f
∂n
is (strictly) increasing in n. We have
f ′(x, n) = − 1
h(x, n)2
h′(x, n),
where h′(x, n) is derived in the previous proof using the implicit function theorem. h
is increasing in n and h′ is non-negative and decreasing in n. Thus h
′
h2
is decreasing in
n, and so − h′
h2
is increasing.
• ∂h
∂n
is increasing in x. This can be seen using the formulation at the end of the proof
for the previous result as terms in ∂
2ψ
∂L2
grow slower in x (in magnitude) than terms
in ∂
2ψ
∂n∂L
. In particular, the first term of ∂
2ψ
∂L2
is decreasing in magnitude since L is
increasing in x. And the integral in ∂
2ψ
∂n∂L
increases faster in x than the integral in
∂2ψ
∂L2
, as can be seen by comparing the integrand numerators (a factor of x2 in ∂
2ψ
∂n∂L
vs. a factor of x in ∂
2ψ
∂L2
).
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• ∂f
∂n
is (strictly) increasing in x This is because h is increasing in x and ∂h
∂n
is non-negative
and increasing in x (previous bullet).
Note additionally that, from the system setup assumptions, all of the functions are ap-
propriately bounded.
Thus we can apply Theorem 3.1 in [26] to get
Var
(
f(X,Ns)|Ft−1
)
< Var
(
f(X,Nu)|Ft−1
)
.
Note that the variances exist because h = Lt is bounded, as shown in previous results. The
variances of Zst and Z
u
t are then obtained by multiplying the above inequality by D2.
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